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1. Introduction: the nature of evil 
  
Evil is the most comprehensive expression of ethical disapproval and, as the reverse of moral 
good, a key concept in any axiology. Of the many conceptual clarifications available in the 
literature, three need to be recalled here to provide the essential background of the paper (1). 
Any action, whether morally loaded or not, has the logical structure of a variably interactive 
process, which relates a set of one or more sources (depending on whether we are working 
within a multiagent context), the agent a, which initiates the process, with a set of one or more 
destinations, the patient p, which reacts to the process (2). To clarify the nature of a and p it is 
useful to borrow the concept of information ‘object’ from the object-oriented analysis paradigm 
(OOA) (3). The agent and the patient are discrete, self-contained, encapsulated (4) packages 
containing:  
the appropriate data structures, which constitute the nature of the entity in question (state of the 
object, its unique identity, and attributes) 
a collection of operations, functions or procedures (methods (5)), which are activated (invoked) 
by various interactions or stimuli, namely messages (in this essay ‘actions’ is used with this 
technical meaning) received from other objects (message passing) or changes within itself, and 
correspondingly define (implement) how the object behaves or reacts to them.  
In Leibnizian and more metaphysical terms, an object is a sufficiently permanent (a continuant) 
information monad, a description of the ultimate primal component of all beings. The moral 
action itself can be constructed as an information process, i.e. a series of messages (M), initiated 
by an agent a, that brings about a transformation of states directly affecting a patient p, which 
may interactively respond to M with changes and/or other messages, depending on how M is 
interpreted by p’s methods, that is  a  p M (a, p).  
When discussing the nature of evil, the following two clarifications are usually accepted as 
standard:  
‘evil’ is a second order predicate that qualifies primarily M.  
Only actions are primarily evil. Sources of evil (agents and their intentional states) are evil in a 
derivative and often unclear sense: intentional states are evil if they (can) lead to evil actions, and 
agents are evil if the preponderance of their intentional states or actions is evil. The domain of 
intentional states or actions, however, is probably infinite, so the concept of ‘preponderance’ is 
based either on a limit in time and scope (a is evil between time t1 and time tn and as far as 
intentional states or actions y are concerned), or on a inductive/probabilistic projection (a is such 
that a’s future intentional states or actions are more likely to be evil than good). Obvious 
difficulties in both approaches reinforce the view that an agent is evil only derivatively; 
the interpretation of a ranges over the domain of all agents, both human and nonhuman.  
Evil actions are the result of human or nonhuman agency (e.g. natural disasters). The former is 
known as moral evil (ME) and it implies autonomy and responsibility, and hence a sufficient 
degree of information, freedom and intentionality. The latter is known as natural evil (NE). It is 
usually defined negatively, as any evil that arises independently of human intervention, in terms 
of prevention, defusing or control. A third clarification, although rather common, is less 
uncontroversial: 
the positive sense in which an action is evil (a’s intentional harming) is parasitic on the privative 
sense in which its effect is evil (decrease in p’s welfare). 
Contrary to ‘responsibility’ an agent-oriented concept that works as a robust theoretical 
‘attractor’, in the sense that standard Macroethics (e.g. Consequentialism or Deontologism) tend 
to concentrate on it for the purpose of moral evaluations of the agent ‘evil’ is a perspicuously 
patient-oriented concept. Actions are ontologically dependent on agents for their implementation 
(evil as cause), but are evaluated as evil only in view of the degree of severe and unnecessary 
harm that they may cause to their patients (evil as effect). Hence, whether an action is evil can be 
decided only on the basis of a clear understanding of the nature and future development of the 
interacting patient.  
Since an action is evil if and only if it harms or tends to harm its patient, evil, understood as the 
harmful effect that could be suffered by the interacting patient, is properly analysed only in terms 
of possible corruption, decrease, deprivation or limitation of p’s welfare, where the latter can be 
defined in terms of the object’s appropriate data structures and methods. This is the classic, 
‘privative’ sense in which evil is parasitic on the good and does not exist independently of the 
latter (evil as privationem boni). In view of this further qualification, and in order to avoid any 
terminological bias, it is better to avoid using the term ‘harm’ a zoocentric, not even biocentric 
word, which implicitly leads to the interpretation of p as a sentient being with a nervous system 
in favour of ‘damage’, an ontocentric, more neutral term, with ‘annihilation’ as the level of most 
severe damage.  
According to the OOA approach endorsed in this paper, messages are processes that affect 
objects either positively or negatively. Positive messages respect or enhance p’s welfare; 
negative messages do not respect or damage p’s welfare. Evil actions are a subclass of negative 
messages, those that do not merely fail to respect p but (can) damage it (for an axiological 
analysis see Floridi (1998)). The following definition attempts to capture the clarifications 
introduced so far: 
(E) Evil action = one or more negative messages, initiated by a, that brings about a 
transformation of states that (can) damage p’s welfare severely and unnecessarily; or more 
briefly, any patient-unfriendly message. 
(E) excludes both victimless and anonymous evil: an action is (potentially) evil only if there is 
(could be) a damaged patient, and there is no evil action without a damaging source, even if, in a 
multiagent and distributed context, this may be sufficiently vague or complex to escape clear 
identification (however, we shall argue below that this does not imply that evil cannot be 
gratuitous). In fact, because standard Macroethics tend to privilege agent-centred analyses, they 
usually concentrate on evil actions a parte agentis, by presupposing the presence of an agent and 
qualifying the agent’s actions as evil, at least hypothetically or counterfactually. On the basis of 
these clarifications, it is now possible to develop five main theses: 
IE (Information Ethics) can defend a deflationary approach to the existence of evil 
ICT (information and communication technology) modifies the interpretation of some evils, 
transforming them from natural into moral 
ICT extends the class of agents, generating a new form of artificial evil (AE) 
ICT extends the class of patients, promoting a new understanding of evil as entropy 
(1)-(4) contribute to clarify the uniqueness debate in computer ethics. 
  
  
2. Nonsubstantialism: a deflationary approach to the existence of evil 
  
The classic distinction ME vs. NE is sufficiently intuitive but may also be misleading. Human 
beings may act as Natural Agents (e.g. unaware and healthy carries of a disease) and natural evil 
may be the mere means of moral evil (e.g. through morally blameworthy negligence). But above 
all, the terminology may be misleading because it is the result of the application of first (‘moral’, 
‘natural’) to a second order (‘evil’) predicate, which paves the way to a questionable 
hypostasization of evil. This substantialism reifies evil as if it were a ‘token’ transmitted by M 
from a to p, an oversimplified ‘communication’ model that is implausible, since a’s messages 
appear to generate negative states only by interacting with p’s methods, and do not seem either to 
be evil independently of them, or to bear and transfer some pre-packaged, perceivable evil by 
themselves.  
To avoid the hypostasization of evil, a nonsubstantialist position (i) must defend a deflationary 
interpretation of evil’s existence without (ii) accepting the equally implausible alternative 
represented by revisionism, i.e. the negation of the existence of evil tout court, which may rely, 
for example, on an epistemological interpretation for its elimination (evil as appearance). This 
can be achieved by (iii) accepting the derivative and privative senses of evil (evil as absence of 
good) to clarify that ‘there is no evil’ means that (iv) only actions, and not objects in themselves, 
can be qualified as primarily evil, and that (v) what type of evil x is should not be decided on the 
basis of the nature of the agent initiating x, since ME and NE do not refer to some special classes 
of entities, which would be intrinsically evil, nor to some special classes of actions per se, but 
they are only shortcuts to refer to a three-place relation between types of agents, actions and 
patients’ welfare, hence to a specific, context-determined interpretation of the triple <a, M, p>.  
The points made in (i)-(v) seem perfectly reasonable. Unfortunately, especially in ancient 
philosophy (6), they have often been overinterpreted as a proof for the non-existence of evil. 
This because nonsubstantialism has been equated with revisionism through an ontology of 
things, i.e. the assumption that either x is a substance, something, or x does not exist. But since 
evil is so widespread in the world, any argument that attempts to deny its existence is doomed to 
be rejected as sophistic. So revisionism is hardly defensible and, through the equation, the 
consequence has been that the presence of evil in the world has often been taken as definitive 
evidence against nonsubstantialism as well and, even more generally, as a final criticism of any 
theory based on (1)-(3) and (i)-(v). It should be obvious, however, that this conclusion is not 
inevitable: nonsubstantialism is deflationary but not revisionist, and it is perfectly reasonable to 
defend the former position by rejecting the implicit reliance on an ontology of things. Actions-
messages and objects’ states, as defined in the OOA paradigm, do not have a lower ontological 
status than objects themselves. Evil exists not absolutely, per se, but in terms of damaging 
actions and damaged objects. The fact that its existence is parasitic does not mean that it is 
fictitious. On the contrary, in an ontology that treats interactions, methods (operations, functions 
and procedures) and states on the same level as objects and their attributes, evil could not be any 
more real. Once an ontology of things is replaced by a more adequate OOA ontology, it becomes 
possible to have all the benefits of talking about evil without the ontological costs of a 
substantialist hypostasization. This is the approach defended by IE (Floridi (1998)). 
  
  
3. The evolution of evil and the theodicean problem 
  
Natural evil has been introduced as any evil that arises through no human action, either positive 
or negative: NE is whatever evil human beings do not initiate and cannot prevent, defuse or 
control (7). Since the discussion on the nature of evil has been largely monopolised by the 
theodicean debate (whether it is possible to reconcile the existence of God and the presence of 
evil), contemporary Macroethics seem to have failed to notice that this definition entails the 
possibility of a diachronic transformation of what may count as NE because of the increasing 
power of design, configuration, prevision and control over reality offered by science and 
technology (sci-tech), including ICT. If a negative definition of NE, in terms of ¬ ME, is not 
only inevitable but also adequate, the more powerful a society becomes, in terms of its sci-tech, 
the more its members are responsible for what is within their power to influence. Past 
generations, when confronted by natural disasters like famine or flood, had little choice but to 
put up with their evil effects. Nowadays, most of the ten plagues of Egypt would be considered 
moral rather than natural evils because of human negligence (8). A clear sign of how much the 
world has changed is that people expect human solutions for virtually any natural evil, even 
when this is well beyond the scientific and technological capacities of present times. Whenever a 
natural disaster occurs, the first reaction has become to check whether anyone is responsible for 
an action that might have initiated or prevented its evil effects.  
The human-independent nature of NE and the powerfulness of science and technology, 
especially ICT, with its computational capacities to forecast future events, determine a peculiar 
phenomenon of constant erosion of NE in favour of an expansion of ME. If anyone were to die 
from smallpox in the future this would certainly be a matter of ME, no longer NE. Witchcraft in 
theory and sci-tech in practice share the responsibility of transforming NE into ME and this is 
why their masters look morally suspicious. It is an erosion that is inevitable, insofar as science 
and technology can constantly increase human power over nature. It may also seem 
unidirectional: at first, it may appear that the only transformation brought about by the evolution 
of sci-tech is a simplification in the nature of evil. However, the introduction of the concept of 
artificial evil (AE) provides a corrective to this view (see next section). If, for the present 
purpose, it is simply assumed that, at least in theory, all NE can become ME but not vice versa, it 
is obvious that this provides an interesting approach to the classic theodicean problem of evil. 
The theist may need to explain only the presence of ME despite the fact that God is omniscient, 
omnipotent, and all-good, and it is known that a theodicy based on the responsibility that comes 
with freedom is more defensible, especially if connected with a nonsubstantialist approach to the 
existence of evil. In a utopian world, the occurrence of evil may be just a matter of human 
misbehaviour. What matters here, of course, is not to solve the theodicean puzzle, but to realise 
how ICT is contributing to make humanity increasingly accountable, morally speaking, for the 
way the world is. 
  
  
4. Artificial evil 
  
More and more often, especially in advanced societies, people are confronted by visible and 
salient evils that are neither simply natural nor immediately moral: an innocent dies because the 
ambulance was delayed by the traffic; a computer-based monitor ‘reboots’ in the middle of 
surgery because its software is not fully compatible with other programs also in use, with the 
result that the patient is at increased risk during the reboot period. The examples could easily be 
multiplied. What kind of evils are these? ‘Bad luck’ and ‘technical incident’ are simply 
admissions of ignorance. Conceptually, they indicate the shortcomings of the ME vs. NE 
dichotomy. The problem is that the latter was formulated at a time when the primary concern 
was anthropocentric, human-agent-oriented and the main issue addressed was that of human and 
divine responsibility. Strictly speaking, the difference between human and Natural Agents is not 
that the former are not natural, but that they are autonomous, i.e. they can regulate themselves. 
So, following the standard approach, the correct taxonomy turns out to be a four-place scheme: 
forms of agency are either natural or artificial (non-natural) and either autonomous or 
heteronomous (non-autonomous). Although this is not the context to provide a detailed analysis 
of an agent, the following definition is sufficiently adequate to clarify these four basic forms of 
agency: 
Agent = a system, situated within and a part of an environment, which initiate a transformation 
produces an effect or exerts power on it over time, as contrasted with a system that is (at least 
initially) acted on or responds to it (patient). 
A Natural Agent is an agent that has its ontological basis in the normal constitution of reality and 
conforms to its course, independently of human beings’ intervention. Conversely, an Artificial 
Agent is an agent that has its ontological basis in a constructed reality and depends, at least for 
its initial appearance, on human beings’ intervention. An autonomous agent is an agent that has 
some kind of control over its states and actions, senses its environment, responds in a timely 
fashion to changes that occur in it and interacts with it, over time, in pursuit of its own goals, 
without the direct intervention of other agents. And a heteronomous agent is simply an agent that 
is not autonomous. Given these clarifications, the taxonomy is:  
Agent Natural Artificial 
Autonomous NAA AAA 
Heteronomous NHA AHA 
  
NAA = natural and autonomous agent, e.g. a person, an animal, an angel, a god, an 
extraterrestrial.  
NHA = natural and heteronomous agent, e.g. a flood, an earthquake, a nuclear fission. 
AAA = artificial and autonomous agent, e.g. a webbot, an expert system, a software virus, a 
robot. 
AHA = artificial and heteronomous agent, e.g. traffic, inflation, pollution. 
ME is any evil produced by a responsible NAA; NE is any evil produced by NHA and by any 
NAA that may not be held directly responsible for it; AE is any evil produced by either AAA or 
AHA. The question now is: is AE always reducible to (perhaps a combination of) NE or ME?  
It is clear that AE is not reducible to NE because of the nature of the agent involved, whose 
existence depends on human creative ingenuity. But this leads precisely to the main objection 
against the presence of AE, namely that any AE is really just a ME under a different name. 
Human creators are morally accountable for whatever evil may be caused by their Artificial 
Agents, as mere means or intermediaries of human activities (indirect responsibility). The 
objection of indirect responsibility is based on an analogy with the theodicean problem and is 
partly justified. In the same way as a divine creator can be blamed for NE, so a human creator 
can be blamed for AE. 
A first reply consists in remarking that even in a theodicean context one still speaks of ‘natural’ 
not of ‘divine’ evils, thus indicating the nature of the agent, not of the morally responsible 
source. But this, admittedly, would be a weak retort, for it misses the important ethical point: if 
NE is ‘real’ then this causes a problem precisely because it is reducible to ‘divine’ evil and, 
mutatis mutandis, this could apply to the relation between AE and ME. AE could be just the 
result of carrying on morally wrong actions by other means. 
A better reply consists in clarifying the differences between the two cases. On the one hand, AE 
may be caused by AHA whose behaviour depends immediately and directly on human 
behaviour. In this case, the reduction AE = ME is reasonable. AHA are just an extension of their 
human creators, like tools, because the latter are both the ontological and the nomological source 
of the formers’ behaviour. Human beings can be taken to be directly accountable for the artificial 
evil involved, e.g. pollution. On the other hand, AAA, whose behaviour is nomologically 
independent of human intervention, may cause AE. In this case, the interpretative model is not 
God vs. created universe, but parents vs. children. Although it is conceivable that the evil caused 
by the children may be partly blamed on their parents, it is also true that, normally, the sins of the 
sons will not be passed on to the fathers. Indirect responsibility can only be forward, not 
backward, as it were. Things are in fact even more complicated than this. For the ‘creatures’ are 
more like pets, agents whose scope of action is very wide, which can cause all imaginable evils, 
but which cannot be taken morally responsible for their behaviour, owing to their insufficient 
degree of intentionality, intelligence and freedom. It turns out that, like in a universe without 
God, in cyberspace evil may be utterly gratuitous: there may be evil actions without any causing 
agent being morally blameable for them. Digital Artificial Agents are becoming sufficiently 
autonomous to pre-empty the possibility that their creators may be nomologically in charge of, 
and hence morally accountable for their misbehaviour. And we are still dealing with a generation 
of agents fairly simple, predictable and controllable. The phenomenon of potential artificial evil 
will become even more obvious as self-produced generations of AAA evolve.  
Of course there is no IT-heodicean problem because the creators, in this case, are fallible, only 
partly knowledgeable, possibly malevolent and may work at cross-purposes, so there is no need 
to explain how the presence of humanity may be compatible with the presence of AE. 
Unfortunately, like Platonic demiurges, fallible creators much less powerful than the Christian 
God, we may not be able to construct truly intelligent AAA, but we can certainly endow them 
with plenty of autonomy and freedom, and it is in this lack of balance that the risk lie. It is clear 
that something similar to Asimov’s Laws of Robotics will need to be enforced for the digital 
environment (the infosphere) to be kept safe. Sci-tech transforms natural into moral evil but at 
the same time creates a new form of evil, AE. In a dystopian world like the one envisaged in the 
film The Matrix, there could be just AE and ME. 
  
  
5. Extending the class of patients of artificial evil 
  
In the previous section we have made the case for an Artificial Agent to be the source of an evil 
action. To contrast that case with the standard one, in which evil applies to the actions of Natural 
Agents, let us call that position Weak Artificial Evil (WAE) (cf. weak AI, Searle 1980). Strong 
Artificial Evil (SAE) is the position that an Artificial Agent can be the patient (or reagent, recall 
the interactive nature of the action-relation between agent and patient) of Artificial Evil. In this 
section we revisit the previous argument and make the case for SAE. 
SAE has been prefigured by the deep ecology of Environmental Ethics (Zimmerman 1993) in 
which the state of inanimate objects is taken into account when considering the consequences of 
an action (e.g. how is building a certain freeway going to impinge on the rockface in its path). 
However, in the form of SAE the concept can be taken further, due largely to the characteristic 
properties of cyberspace, i.e. the (eco)system of information acted on by digital agents. The 
information is stored as bits, but encompasses vast tracts of data in the form of databases, files, 
records and online archives. The agents are programs and so include operating systems and 
applications software. Cyberspace is spanned by the Internet, which provides the vacuous but 
connected space; it is populated by all that data and programs and is lent geometrical presence by 
the web. It is to be emphasised that it is not helpful, for present purposes and despite its name, to 
conceive of cyberspace spatially. The rapid search and communications that are part of the web 
ensure that only addresses matter. Indeed, the features of importance to us here are: 
spatiality: completeness of the network (any site is available from any other: point-to-point 
connectivity); homogeneity (standardised addresses); robustness against failure (Cartesian 
multiplicity of links); 
democracy: nonhierarchical; not policed; free where possible; user extensible; 
real-time: fast synchronous access to sites and fast asynchronous email communication; high 
bandwidth; 
digitised: standardised digital storage and communications (both interpreted consistently 
throughout cyberspace). 
Features (a)-(d) seem to characterise interactions in cyberspace. For example ecommerce 
exploits (a), (b), (c); downloading free music exploits (b), (d). 
The frontier of cyberspace is the human/machine interface; thus we regard humans as lying 
outside cyberspace. In his famous Test (Turing 1950), Turing posited a keyboard/screen interface 
to blanket human and computer. Half a century later, that very interface has become part of our 
everyday reality. Helped perhaps by the ubiquitous television and the part it has played in 
informing and entertaining us, we are coming to rely on that interface for communication 
(email), information (sites), business (ecommerce) and entertainment (computer games). The all-
pervading nature of cyberspace seems at present to depend partly on the extent to which we 
accept its interface as integral to our reality; indeed we have begun to accept the virtual as 
reality. What matters is not so much moving bits instead of atoms–this is an outdated, 
communication-based interpretation of the information society that owes too much to mass-
media sociology–as the far more radical fact that the very essence and fabric of reality is 
changing. The information society is better seen as a neo-manufacturing society in which raw 
materials and energy have been superseded by the new digital gold. Not just communication and 
transactions then, but the creation, design and management of information are the keys to its 
proper understanding.  
Cyberspace supports a variety of agents: from routine service software (like communications 
protocols) through less routine applications packages (like cybersitters, webbots) to applets 
downloadable from remote web sites. The latter highlight a shift in the burden of responsibility 
of software engineers. Formerly, (and still, of course, in the bulk of situations today) there was a 
contract between software engineer and user; the software engineer was responsible for the 
performance of the software, defensible if necessary at law. That model suited the context in 
which computers, or local-area networks, were isolated from others, except by physical media 
(disks, CDROMs, etc). In the new model, promoted by cyberspace, there is no ‘point of sale’, 
since a program may be downloaded at one of a sequence of mouse clicks, with no clear 
responsibility or even specification attending its acquisition. So seamless is the interface that the 
user may not even be aware that a program has been downloaded and executed locally: (b), (c). 
The autonomy (and hence seamlessness) of that interaction is further reinforced by Artificial 
Agents which employ randomisation in making decisions (the giver of a coin can hardly be held 
responsible for decisions made on the basis of tossing it, even if the coin is sold as a binary-
decision-making mechanism); and Artificial Agents which are able to adapt their behaviour on 
the basis of experience (in only an indirect sense were the programmers of Deep Blue 
responsible for its win, since it ‘learnt’ by being exposed to volumes of games, (King 1997)) (9). 
Given the presence of such agents, and the tendency towards further autonomy, the only 
reasonable view seems to be that misfortune resulting from such programs is evil for which 
neither human nor nature is directly responsible. Such a situation does not appear in the physical 
world inhabited by mechanical artifacts because their physical presence renders such machines, 
and their behaviour, traceable to their origins. Were they autonomous and able to transform and 
adapt, in the way programs can, such machines would provide an analogous example of AE; but 
so far they seem to be no more than instruments of science fiction (10). 
Cyberspace and its interface support actions that may originate from humans (email from a 
colleague) or Artificial Agents (messages from a word processor or directives from a webbot). 
The claim is not that current software has passed the Turing Test. It is simply that, with the types 
of software mentioned above, there is scope for evil that lies beyond the responsibility of human 
beings or nature. 
Our region of cyberspace is in general changed as a result of the autonomous execution of 
Artificial Agents: decisions are delegated to routine procedures, data are altered, settings 
changed and programs subsequently behave differently. Artificial Patients in cyberspace thus 
‘respond’ or ‘react’, often interactively, to actions. Some actions seem benign: the easter eggs 
cuckoo-ed inside Macintosh and Palm software (Pogue 1999, p. 36) constitute such examples. It 
seems equally clear that certain actions on Artificial Patients are evil: viruses and the action of 
certain webbots, for example. But the case for an Artificial Agent being the recipient of evil (and 
in particular, Artificial Evil) depends on our being able to make the case for determining when 
the preponderance of consequences as far as the patient goes are bad. For that, we rely on the 
digital nature of cyberspace and employ the notion of entropy. We summarise an argument 
begun in (Floridi 1998) and developed in (Floridi and Sanders 1999). 
First, we observe that an action in cyberspace is not uncontroversially bad or good; some value 
judgement is required to evaluate its moral worth. Thus it is a matter of judgement and context 
whether we regard as good or bad the effect of running a program: it might delete useful data (as 
might a virus) and so be judged bad, or it might perform useful garbage collection by removing 
inaccessible data. In (Floridi and Sanders 1999) we have made the case for entropy structures as 
a means of evaluating an action in cyberspace that combines judgements about desirable features 
of cyberspace with its discrete, and hence unambiguously definable, nature. An entropy structure 
is an ordering on cyberspace defined to capture the notion of a bad state change. The state-after 
is worse than the state-before. The state S of cyberspace consists of the values of all data, 
including software. A bad action changes state S1 into S2, where S2 is greater in the entropy 
ordering; a benign action decreases the entropy ordering. By (d) the effect of any action is 
characterised, as a state transformer, mathematically by the relationship (a predicate) between the 
state-before, the input and output, and the state-after (in the example above, state is partitioned 
into used and unused store and the action converts some used store into unused store). It is then a 
matter of proof or counterexample whether an action is bad (none of its transitions yields an 
after-state which is greater in the entropy ordering than its before-state) or evil (there is a before-
state and a transition in which the after-state is greater in the entropy ordering). Furthermore, the 
formalism can be used to determine when one action is more, or less, evil than another. The 
increase of entropy has been chosen, of course, to match the standard view from 
thermodynamics. However, in that setting no judgement is required since any increase, leading 
as it does to an increase in global randomness, is deemed bad (for formal definitions, examples 
and further discussion see Floridi and Sanders 1999). In summary, it is reasonable to permit an 
Artificial Agent to be the patient of evil and thus to have a moral standing. We conclude that the 
interpretation of the relational and interactive structure, symbolised by the triple <agent, action, 
patient>, is one of the central component of any Information Ethics. 
  
  
6. The uniquess debate 
  
The informative ‘uniqueness’ debate (Johnson 1999 and Maner 1999) has aimed to determine 
whether the issues confronting CE are unique and hence whether, as a result, CE should be 
developed as an independent Macroethics. By concentrating on just the aspect of AE, the view 
presented above suggests that to concentrate on uniqueness may not be necessary in order to 
reach that conclusion. Although it is manifest in cyberspace and readily studied there, AE is not 
necessarily unique to CE. It may be apparent, for example, in Environmental Ethics and in the 
world of physical automata (if only potentially in the latter case). Because of its novelty and 
important position in Ethics, AE seems to demand further study in its own right. Because it 
embraces many of the current difficulties of CE, it should be studied in, amongst other places, an 
applied setting where appropriate policy decisions can be analysed. The setting of CE seems 
appropriate, then, for at least three reasons: 
CE has a methodological foundation IE (Floridi 1999a) and so is able to support theoretical 
analysis; 
CE contains domain-specific issues, including pressing practical problems, which can be used to 
‘test’ the results of (a). Moreover, standard forms of evil are also present and so can be used for 
purposes of comparison; 
cyberspace is digital, and the notion of state rigorous, so actions can be quantified entirely; hence 
all consequences of an action in cyberspace can in principle be determined mathematically (cf. 
entropy structures), by contrast with the world of interacting sentient beings. 
It may be that, in the uniqueness debate, the justification of the study of CE as a Macroethics has 
focussed on uniqueness of the issues confronting it as a result of the policy vacuum approach 
(Moor 1985). Although that view has done much to isolate and promote the novelty of problems 
confronting CE, perhaps it has led us to think that such a vacuum is required to justify the study 
of CE. By considering just one special topic that of AE we hope to have made the case 





(1) The model follows but does not pressupose knowledge of Floridi (1998). back 
(2) The terms ‘agent’ and ‘patient’ are standard in Ethics and therefore will be maintained in this 
paper, however, it is essential to stress the interactive nature of the process and hence the fact 
that the patient is hardly ever a passive receiver of an action. A better way to qualify the patient 
in connection with the agent would be to refer to it as the ‘reagent’. back 
(3) The article follows the standard terminology and the conceptual apparatus provided by James 
Rumbaugh et al. (1991). back 
(4) Encapsulation or information hiding is the technique of keeping together data structures and 
the methods (class-implemented operations), which act on them in such a way that the package's 
internal structure can be accessed only by means of the approved package routines. External 
aspects of an object, which are accessible to other objects, are thus separated from the internal 
implementation details of the object itself, which remain hidden from other objects. back 
(5) A method is a particular implementation of an operation, i.e. an action or transformation that 
an object performs or is subject to by a certain class. An operation may be implemented by more 
than one method. back 
(6) Especially in the Platonic tradition, see Plato, Proclus, Plotin, Augustine, but also Aristotle 
and in modern times Leibniz and Spinoza. back 
(7) It is probably useful to conceive different kinds of NE as placed on a scale, from the not-
humanly-initiated and not-preventable earthquake (only the evil effects of it can be a matter of 
human responsibility) to the not-humanly-initiated but humanly preventable plague to the 
humanly initiated and preventable mistake (human agents as natural causes). back 
(8) It may be interesting to stress that in the Old Testament the plagues have mainly an 
ontological value, as signs of total control and power over reality, rather than ethical. Several 
times the Pharaoh’s magicians are summoned to deal with the extraordinary phenomena, but the 
point is always whether they may be able to achieve the same effects ‘by their secret arts’ 
hence showing that there is either no divine intervention or equal divine support on the Egyptian 
side not whether they can undo or solve the difficulties caused by the specific plague. They 
loose the ‘ontic game’ when ‘the magicians tried by their secret arts to bring forth gnats, but they 
could not’. back 
(9) Mitchell (1997) provides the following examples of adaptive software: ‘data-mining 
programs that learn to detect fraudulent credit-card transactions, to information-filtering 
programs that learn users’ reading preferences, to autonomous vehicles that learn to drive on 
public highways.’ back 
(10) For mechanisms that adapt to terrain see http://www.parc.xerox.com/modrobots. For 
statistically adaptive reconfigurable logic arrays, see 
http://jisp.cs.nyu.edu/RWC/rwcp/activities/achievements/AD/nec/eng/home-e.html. In fiction 
adaptive robots occur in the work of James P Hogan (e.g. `Two faces of Tomorrow’ (1979) in 
which a semi-intelligent system controls a production line as part of a space station and, under 
pressure of attack, designs and produces different kinds of robot) and the popular film 
Terminator 2 (in which the shape-shifting cyborg, T-1000 is sent back from the future to kill 
John Connor before he can grow up to lead the resistance). back 
(11) This paper was given at the conference entitled "Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry 
2000", held at Dartmouth College, July 14-16, 2000, see the Proceedings of CEPE 2000, edited 
by D. G. Johnson, J. H. Moor and H. T. Tavani. Pp. 142-156. back 
